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This text argues that the emergence 
of the idea of risk management can 
be traced down to the use of deriva-
tives in the financial sector in the early 
1970s. Critically engaged with Michael 
Power’s approach on rise of risk man-
agement as a common organizational 
practice in the 1990s, the article main-
tains that risk as manageable matter 
can be traced back to the use of Black-
Scholes-Merton model for pricing 
options in the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (cboe) since 1973. Ideas of 
calculation, measurement, and man-
agement of risk can be detected at this 
point. This is an exercise of theorization 
that aims to identify the role of ideas in 
the economic practices so as to allow a 
historicization of technical knowledge. 
Keywords: Calculation, Derivatives, 
Financialization, Management, Risk.
 * DOI: https://doi.org/10.18601/16577175.n21.06
 1 Master of Arts in Global Political Economy. Political Scientist. E-
mail: alejomh_91@hotmail.com.
CalCulaTINg fOR maNagINg: ThE EmERgENCE Of 
ThE IDEa Of RIsk maNagEmENT*
CalCulaR PaRa aDmINIsTRaR: El suRgImIENTO DE 
la IDEa DEl maNEjO DEl RIEsgO
alejandro morales henao1
REsumEN
Este texto argumenta que el surgimiento 
de la idea del manejo del riesgo puede 
rastrearse en el uso de las derivadas 
en el sector financiero a principios de 
los años 70. A través de una discusión 
crítica con la propuesta de Michael 
Power sobre la consolidación del 
manejo del riesgo como una práctica 
organizacional común en los años 90, 
el artículo afirma que el riesgo como 
asunto administrable se remonta al 
uso del modelo Black-Scholes-Merton 
para fijar los precios de las opciones en 
el Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(cboe) desde 1973. La idea de cálculo, 
medición y manejo del riesgo se pu-
eden situar hasta ese momento. Este es 
un ejercicio de teorización que busca 
identificar el papel de las ideas en las 
prácticas económicas, de tal manera 



































































Palabras clave: Cálculo, Derivadas, 
Financiarización, Gestión, Riesgo.
“Can we know the risks we face, now 
or in the future? No, we cannot; but 
yes, we must act as if we do.” 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982)
INTRODuCTION2
The idea of risk has become popular, 
although its definition and scope is not 
clear. It can be associated with harm 
and danger, as well as with opportu-
nity. Nonetheless, whatever risk refers 
to, its uses in today’s society depict an 
important process of reflection about 
how to deal with it. This paper attempts 
to understand the emergence of risk 
management in the 1990s as a popular 
practice among organizations, shedding 
light on the importance of risk as an idea 
that regards the world as amenable to 
human decision and intervention.
As Michael Power (2007) argues, to say 
that the future is unknowable or, in the 
same way, trying to find a singular defi-
nition of risk (of uncertainty, as well) 
maybe is trivial, but asking for “the 
historical and social conditions under 
which organization come to embody 
imagined contingent outcomes as ob-
jects of management practice” (Power, 
2014), is not. In other words, it is more 
fruitful to question about social condi-
tions in which an idea of risk is estab-
lished and how different actors (in this 
case, organizations) deal with it, than 
to put the efforts in building a general 
idea of what risk is. In this sense, this 
text proposes a history of how risk be-
came something measurable, calculable 
and manageable. Critically engaged 
with Michael Power’s proposal about 
the emergence of risk management as 
a common organizational practice in 
the 1990s, I argue that the idea of risk 
management can be traced down to the 
use of derivatives in the financial sector 
in the early 1970s.
 The increasing role of finance in the 
economy and in daily life (Navarro and 
Torres, 2012; Van der Zwan, 2014), in 
general, is partially explained by the 
spreading use of derivatives in finance. 
The so-called financialization3 process 
 2 This paper was presented as a final assessment of the Political Eco-
nomy of Global Finance course, part of the master in Global Political 
Economy at the University of Sussex. This was funded by the British 
Council Chevening Scholarship. I would like to thank Prashant Kumar 
and Samuel Knafo for their thoughtful and accurate comments.
 3 Despite this paper uses the context of “financialization” in order to 
explain the emergence of risk management as a popular practice, it is not 
about that phenomenon. It is complex and the increasing literature that 
are focused on make it even more. As Epstein (2005) contends, “there 
is not even common agreement about the definition of the term,” yet, it 
is essential to consider some analysis. In the introduction to the special 
issue of Socio-Economic Review, Kornich and Hicks (2015) briefly 
expose a myriad of consequences of financialization on inequality, 
economic growth, labour market, and household’s culture. Deutschmann 
(2011), from a sociological perspective, considers financialization as 
a hegemonial regime of financers over entrepreneurs. For Lapavitsas 
(2011), financialization not only encompasses a shift in which large 
corporations acquired independent financial skills and banks have turned 

































was facilitated by the easy use of these 
kind of financial tools since the 1980s 
and 1990s. It is important to highlight 
that the use of derivatives is not new; 
rather, they have a long history that 
can be traced back for many centuries 
(Swan, 2000). Nonetheless, its recent 
expansion must be framed in the con-
vergence of new pricing theories, new 
computational technologies, and a 
friendly environment for speculation 
in the early 1970s. All this rested on the 
idea that risk4 could be calculated and 
utilized in a profitable way.
The role of derivatives in the financial-
ization, however, must be understood 
not only from a quantitative, but also 
from a qualitative perspective. As 
Wigan (2009), and Bryan and Rafferty 
(2006) assert, derivates embody a new 
way of dealing with risk as well as a way 
of trading with it. For Wigan, risk is the 
object exchanged within the financial 
process with no ties with real economy. 
Bryan and Rafferty, in the same way, 
consider derivatives as a commodifica-
tion of risk. Using those perspectives, as 
it will be argued, it is possible to trace 
down the idea of risk as a manageable 
matter to the emergence of the use of 
derivatives in the 1970s. 
The emergence of risk management in 
the 1990s, as Power (2014) analyses, 
was the result of the confluence of three 
logics: anticipation, the scientific aspi-
ration to know and calculate the future; 
resilience, adaptation to unforeseeable 
events (focused on the ability of the 
organization); and, auditability, risk 
management must be demonstrated and 
evidenced (Power, 2014). I attempt to 
go further. I argue that the idea of risk as 
manageable matter can be traced back 
to the way of handling risk through uti-
lizing derivatives in the financial sector 
in the 1970s, particularly, in the use of 
Black-Scholes-Merton model for pric-
ing options in the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange (cboe) since 1973. With 
a conjunction of new pricing models 
(legitimized by academics), advanced 
mathematical skills, new technology, 
and a social context favourable to new 
economic activities, the idea of manage-
to mediating transactions in an open market (Lapavitsas, 2011, p. 623), 
but also a process in which an increasing number of people are involved 
in operations of finance, a “financialization of everyday life.” Some 
analysis focus on the different dimensions on the process. On the one 
hand, Aalbers (2017) notices ten dimensions of this phenomenon, with 
its correspondent variations and combinations. On the other, Orhangazi 
(2008) shows that in the growing literature on financialization, three 
types of approach can be identified. First, a “long-wages approach,” 
that considers this phenomenon as a current within the capitalist history; 
second, an approach that considers financialization as part of a systemic 
change related to neoliberalism, and, third, a set of authors focused on 
the role of finances and the governance of Non-Financial Companies 
(nfcs). At this point, it is enough to quote what Lagoarde-Segot (2016) 
says about this, “financialization constitutes a relevant metaphor for 21st 
century financial research.”  
 4 As Beck (2000) asserts the idea of risk “reverse the relation of past, 
present, and future,” that is, the past does not determine present-day 
actions, this place is taken by the future. A “possible future” that we are 
trying to grasp from the present.

































ment of risk emerged as a central point 
in organizational practices. In that re-
spect, this is an exercise of theorization 
that follows the poststructural proposal 
of expanding the limits of the political 
economy bringing to the role of ideas 
in the political and economic practices 
so as to allow the historicization of 
technical knowledge (De Goede, 2004, 
2005, 2006). 
This paper is structured as follows. 
In the next section, I review some 
perspectives that analyse derivatives 
from qualitative perspectives as well 
as the Michel Power’s explanation on 
the emergence of risk management as 
a popular practice. In the third section, 
I explain how in the use of derivatives, 
as a way of dealing with risk in the 
1970s in financial sector, it is possible 
to find the idea of calculation and 
instrumentalization that later would 
influence the emergence of risk man-
agement as a common practice among 
organizations in the 1990s. The central 
point to demonstrate how the use of 
the Black-Scholes-Merton model for 
pricing options in the cboe allows us 
to understand the emergence of some 
practices that would determine risk 
management, namely, Enterprise Risk 
Management and Value-at-Risk. In the 
last section, I draw some conclusions.
DERIVaTIVEs aND RIsk 
maNagEmENT: a lITERaTuRE 
REVIEW 
Financialization is mostly associated to 
speculation5, and speculation, in turn, is 
related to the use of derivatives (Dodd, 
2005). However, as Norfield (2012) 
aptly shows, financial speculators not 
only use derivatives for making a bet 
on price-movements, they also use 
them to hedge their risk. Derivatives are 
strategies for dealing with risk. As it is 
well-known (Swan, 2000; Greenberger, 
2013), they were created to hedge price 
risk in corn among the farmers and grain 
merchants in Chicago in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. They referred, 
in basic terms, to future contracts whose 
“purpose is to capture, in form of price 
changes, some underlying price change 
or event” (Dodd, 2005, p.149). In the 
first instance, they are derived from the 
price of an underlying security or com-
modity. Nowadays, there are deriva-
tives of several different types ranging 
from swaps, options, forward contracts, 
warrants, structured bonds, convertible 
bonds (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006, pp. 
46-47) and the most popular Over-
the-Counter (otc) or custom-made 
derivatives which are almost entirely 
unregulated6. Each of them constitute 
an amalgam of high-level mathematical 
 5 As Knafo (2009) argues, Contrary to the common belief, speculation 
is not the result of the liberalisation in open market economies. Instead, 
it is result of practices rooted in specific institutional structures.
 6 otc, as Scott (2013, p. 60) asserts, are “perfectly legal, but together 
they appear like a global black market in financial instruments”. This 
author does an interesting exposition of what derivatives refer to, rang-
ing from different types of those, uses, and their nature. He concludes, 
“derivatives are, in effect, bets that can either be used to speculate on 
something (to take on risk), or to “hedge” against something (to protect 
against risk)” (Scott, 2013, p. 63). Then, it is impossible to think about 
derivatives without taking into account risk and risk management. 

































calculation, high-technical trade and 
hundreds of actors.
Moving away from their technical 
complexity, derivatives have been 
seen as a manifestation of changing 
economic and social relations that 
have shaped the global economy since 
the 1970s. LiPuma and Lee (2005) 
consider derivatives–particularly, fi-
nancial derivatives as the result of the 
problems of monetary connectivity due 
to the outsourcing of production, “the 
proliferation and institutionalization 
of contractual outsourcing (an agree-
ment to supply a product over a given 
timespan) reconfigured and increased 
the risks that corporations had to deal 
with. To hedge against these risks, 
financial institutions began to develop 
derivatives and their markets for their 
corporate clientele.” (LiPuma and Lee, 
2005, p. 406). Derivatives (products 
and markets) emerged as part of a new 
socio-structural circulation along with 
a new conception of risk. This new con-
ception of risk, the notion of “abstract 
risk” embodied in derivatives functions 
as a social mediation, “creating a new 
form of interdependence in the sphere of 
circulation.” (LiPuma and Lee, 2005, p. 
422). To state their argument succinctly, 
what makes the emergent culture of 
finance circulation historically new is 
the objectification of risk, that is, the 
creation of derivatives by objectifying 
context-specific risk to price them, and 
also objectifies abstract risk. In this 
sense, as they assert, risk can exist in 
an abstract way, facilitating its use in 
a purely mathematical understanding.
However, those bets depict a measurable aspect of the risk, it is a way 
of pricing risk, hence, making them tradable. 
In the same vein, Duncan Wigan (2009), 
placing derivatives in the core of the 
dynamics of financialised accumula-
tion asserts a new relation between 
derivatives and risk. Pointing out the 
necessity of assessing the impact of 
derivatives from a qualitative way, he 
argues that they “instrumentalise risk 
as a new way of ownership, a new 
object and means of appropriation and 
control, which rests in circulation and 
contests finance as a site of accumula-
tion in and of itself.” (Wigan, 2009, p. 
159). Derivatives allow an ownership 
wherein there are no ties to an asset, 
that is, derivatives as an “artifice of 
indifference” enable financialization as 
an accumulative process, without taking 
into account the so-called real economy. 
For Wigan, the relation between deriva-
tive and the idea of risk management is 
crucial. As he asserts, through an idea 
of risk management (under the guise of 
financial precision), derivatives allow 
financial expansion. However, in this 
context, there is no management of an 
external risk (as a falling in production), 
rather, derivatives offer the promise 
of financialized accumulation which 
does not rest so much on a link with 
real economy as “the construction of 
an alternative arena of accumulation in 
which the object is risk” (Wigan, 2009, 
p. 163). We are exchanging risk, not 
commodities. 
What is important to highlight here is 
that Wigan’s analysis allow us to grasp 
the qualitative dimension of derivatives. 
Beyond the financial expansion that 

































considers derivatives as instruments 
that enable trade in a monumental scale, 
there is an assumption that address all 
this process; derivatives must be under-
stood in the specific context of theoreti-
cal innovation, “a system of ideas and 
calculative rationality, risk embodies a 
project to align the discourse of finance 
with the subjectivity of liberalism and 
ring fence the financial system behind a 
veil of precision.” (Wigan, 2009, p.159). 
In brief, using derivatives has allowed to 
calculate risk, at the same time, shaping 
it as a new way of ownership. Risk is 
now a commodity. 
In the same qualitative understanding of 
derivatives, Bryan and Rafferty (2006) 
point out that derivatives are not just 
another financial tool, in fact, they are 
“transforming the system of calculation 
under capitalism.” (Bryan and Rafferty, 
2006, p. 5). In analysing the economic 
and social role of derivatives, they assert 
that derivatives must be considered as 
a commodification of risk, “a form of 
calculation and market transaction that 
is intrinsic to the logic of a capitalist 
economy.” (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006, 
p. 8). As they contend, in studying 
derivatives, it is possible to go to the 
heart of calculation and competition 
within capitalism so that understanding 
its recent transformations.
For these authors, derivatives are im-
portant due to two intrinsic features: 
“binding,” that is, to establish pricing 
relations that “bind” the future to the 
present; and “blending,” that refers to 
set pricing relationships convertible 
between forms of assets (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2006, p. 12). These charac-
teristics allow derivatives to become in 
a “universal measure of value, for this 
measure is what derivatives are enact-
ing” (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006, p. 35). 
Two aspects must be highlighted in their 
analysis: on the one hand, derivatives 
are in the core of the process of finan-
cialization, not only for being easy to 
create (as the OTC market depicts), but 
also because they become a universal 
measure (aspect considered by Wigan 
as well). On the other hand, for these 
authors, derivatives and risk manage-
ment are strongly intertwined, “we 
see in derivatives the language of risk 
management–that life’s contingencies 
(for corporations and for individuals) 
can be reduced to commodified risk, 
for that, in essence, is what derivatives 
are: commodities that manage risk. 
(…) Once we engage the issues of risk 
management, it becomes apparent that 
derivatives do something rather basic: 
They provide a means to convert the 
value of assets in one form into assets 
in another form, and so take the risk out 
of holding any particular form of asset.” 
(Bryan and Rafferty, 2006, p. 38).
Reading derivatives from a qualitative 
perspective enables us to understand 
what is at stake: An idea of risk as a 
measurable thing that is in the core of 
the financed accumulation (Wigan), 
of the new way of finance circulation 
(LiPuma and Lee), and plays the role 
of universal measure that allows risk to 
be tradable (Bryan and Rafferty). The 
very idea of calculation and rational-
ization underlies in these perspectives 
and, along with specific social moment 
and certain technical innovations, al-
low the emergence of the idea of risk 

































as a manageable aspect of social and 
economic life. 
As Bernstein (1996a) points out, the 
boundary between modern times and 
the past is the quantification of risk, 
“the notion that the future is more than 
a whim of the gods and that men and 
women are not passive before nature.” 
(Bernstein, 1996b) Even more, as Beck 
(1992) asserts, the idea of risk is bound 
to the concept of reflexive moderniza-
tion, that is, it is an essential part of 
what modern societies think about 
them (politically reflexive). However, 
as Bernstein (1996b) shows, it was a 
long and complex path moving away 
from superstition to supercomputers. 
Since the Renaissance and its ideal 
of scientific experimentation, through 
Pascal and his solution to mathematical 
puzzles, Leibniz–among other thinkers, 
and his uses of probability as a power-
ful instrument to analyse information, 
till the most recent developments in 
statistics, allowed building the idea that 
handling to the future was possible. The 
essence of risk management rests on this 
complex network of ideas. 
Michael Power (2007) traces the growth 
of risk management as phenomenon in 
which risk has become a mandatory fea-
ture of organizational life in the 1990s, 
he is interested in answer the question 
of “why risk and its management has 
emerged at a particular time from spe-
cific sub-fields to become a visibility 
preferred idiom for such a wide range 
of practices and a model for governance 
itself.” (Power, 2007, p. 12). Power 
points the gradual convergence between 
risk calculation and risk management. 
Despite the former can be traced back 
to the nineteenth century with math-
ematical and statistical experimenta-
tion (in agriculture, for instance), only 
since 1995 the process of dealing with 
risk has become managerial in form 
(Power, 2007, p. 4). In other words, for 
Power, the question is not about what 
risk or risk management is; rather, he 
endeavours to explain how uncertainty 
becomes risk through a process of 
decidability and actionability, that is, 
in managerial form. Consequently, for 
Power, risk is socially constructed. Peo-
ple never encounter risk as a pure given, 
rather, it is interpreted and coordinated 
through systems of representation that 
ultimately define what risk is, how to 
deal with and through what processes, 
“the social construction of risk must be 
engage with the social construction of 
management practices to govern risk.” 
(Power, 2007, p. 20). 
Power’s idea of “organized uncertainty” 
allows us to intertwine two aspects on 
risk: on the one hand, the construction 
of risk objects, that is, the importance 
of the recognition of the significance 
of risk perception. The role of ideas 
and fictional objectives that constitute 
rationalities is the core of the analy-
sis; therefore, risk is, at first, an idea 
socially constructed by actors that 
define its nature. On the other hand, 
the construction of risk management. 
“The organizational construction and 
translation of uncertainty into risk”, as 
Power (2007, p. 186) points out, depicts 
the emergence and consolidation of 
sociotechnical network that allowed 
management system for governing risk. 
Standardization and a new “academic 

































clergy” (Power, 2007, p. 190) enabled 
a general growth of multiple ways of 
dealing with risk. 
His analysis, notwithstanding supported 
by lots of empirical examples, is broadly 
about the implementation of key ideas 
within a management discourse (Power 
2007, p. 24). Despite, as I will expose 
in the next section, Power’s analysis is 
fruitful putting the emergence of risk 
management as a popular practice in the 
mid-1990s, with the uses of different or-
ganizational process such as Enterprise 
Risk Management and Value-at-Risk. 
The aim of this text is to demonstrate 
how this idea of calculation of risk, 
hence, of management of it, emerges 
with the use of derivatives in the early 
1970s. That idea, as it will be argued, 
pressured changes within organizations, 
among them, risk management.
CalCulaTION, DERIVaTIVEs, 
aND fINaNCE: ThE 
EmERgENCE Of RIsk 
maNagEmENT
Calculation is part of the modern so-
ciety. Its relationship with sciences 
and technology creates an aura of neu-
trality rested on the legitimacy of its 
objective–knowing and controlling the 
world, as well as of its means–scientific 
discourses and technical developments. 
However, as Kalthoff (2005, p. 74) as-
serts, calculation refers to expectation 
and interpretation. Therefore, so much 
important is to ask for the accurateness 
of a calculation as is to inquire from 
which point of view this calculation is 
framed. The latter leads us to study what 
kind of ideas, actors, and practices are 
involved in the emergence of this way of 
calculation, that is, a practice of radical 
historicism (Knafo and Teschke, 2017).
As aforementioned, financialization is 
intertwined to the calculation of risk 
through using derivatives. These have 
been at the core of the increasing role 
of finances within the economy. The 
quantitative impact of this expansion is 
evident. According to the Bank of Inter-
national Settlement (bis), in 2016, the 
average day of otc foreign exchange 
instruments was 6,5 billion US dollars 
(bis, 2016). This information depicts 
the immense pressure of finance on the 
economic actors, but, overall, on the 
organizations performance. As Power 
(2012, p. 302) notices, accounting has 
had to change its practices in order 
to face the problems of “accounting 
for and representing the risk of de-
rivatives.” Financialization radically 
changed the processes of valuations7. 
Notwithstanding, as I will demonstrate 
below, beyond the spread of “maximiz-
ing shareholder value” as a principle of 
corporate governance (Lazonick, 2013), 
rested on a short-time perspective, 
and the new dynamics of production 
and distribution within the economy, 
financialization pressured “the abstrac-
tion, rationalization, and expansion of 
risk management ideas since the mid-
1990s.” (Power, 2007, p. 3). Insomuch 
as the use of derivatives was facilitated 
by the emergence of option pricing 
theories in the early 1970s, they were 
not only conceived as a way of dealing 
 7 Power (2012, p. 303) names this process as “financialization of the 
financial accounting model.”

































with risk, in abstract terms, but also a 
calculable way of pricing that risk. The 
idea of calculating risk–in this case, by 
market prices, enabled the possibility 
of handling risk in different aspects of 
the economy, allowing the quantitative 
expansion of risk management or, in 
Power’s terms, the “risk management 
of everything.” (Power, 2004) 
For Power (2014, p. 370), it is impos-
sible to study organizations without 
considering uncertainty, furthermore, 
organizations are essential in order to 
understand different ways by which risk 
has been organized in a society. Orga-
nizing uncertainty, therefore, depicts not 
only how organizations define risk, but 
also how society in general conceives 
it. In this sense, the emergence since the 
mid-1990s of new categories and ideas 
that re-shaped discourses of risk man-
agement (Power, 2007, p. 28) embodied 
a broader social phenomenon, namely, 
the idea of risk as a something that could 
be calculable, hence, manageable. 
Risk become a powerful organizing 
category for managerial and administra-
tive practice due to a set of changes that 
explains the shift from risk analysis to 
risk governance. According to Power 
(2007), two processes determined this: 
On the one hand, the rise of the internal 
control as autonomous field of exper-
tise depicted a large transformation in 
corporate governance as well as in the 
role of public regulatory process. The 
risk-based regulation is, at the same 
time, a discourse of opportunity that 
demands freedom of who can ‘prove’ 
they are less risky (Power, 2007, p. 
23). That is, organizations have be-
come co-responsible of the regulatory 
process, in which internal control was 
the signal of this responsibility. Also, 
it implied a transformation of the state. 
This regulates as well as plays the role 
of the risk manager of last resort. The 
“audit implosion and internal control 
explosion” (Power, 2007, p. 47) means 
not only a new way of governing or-
ganization, but, more importantly, also 
the rising legitimization of rationalized 
control (Power, 2007, p. 63). On the 
other hand, the standardization of risk 
management. The concept of Enterprise 
Risk Management (erm) emerged “as a 
web of normativity about risk handling, 
its formalization in standards and its 
status as world-level model of good 
governance” (Power, 2007, p. 98). 
What is important to highlight here is 
that erm embodies the change from 
risk analysis to risk management. Risk 
analysis emerges as discipline in the 
1960s, then, the financial economics 
appears in the 1980s as a specific devel-
opment in information technology, in 
which “risk was to be studied, analysed, 
and calculated as volatility in financial 
returns based on the mathematics of 
mean-variance analysis.” (Power, 2007, 
p. 70). Risk management emerges, 
through erm perspective, as a whole 
of enterprise risk measure, that is, erm 
as a demand for the identification of all 
collective risk that eventually affects 
company value. 
Nonetheless, Power (2007) suggests the 
role of finances in this idea of calculat-
ing risk, he does not emphasize on it. It 
is important to reckon that the process of 
analysing value is rooted on the idea of 
price and its relation to risk stems from 

































the use of pricing theories in financial 
derivatives markets. 
The growth of financial derivatives 
market, as Bryan and Rafferty (2006, p. 
50) point out, can be explained for three 
factors: price volatility from the early 
1970s associated to the end of Bretton 
Woods and the collapse of national and 
international commodity price stabilisa-
tion schemes, the increased importance 
of finance in investments (growth of Eu-
rofinance markets), and the internation-
alisation of trade and investment (aspect 
highlighted by LiPuma and Lee as well). 
Those aspects, however, do not explain 
completely the exponential growth of 
the use of derivatives since the 1970s 
and 1980s. The consolidation of a 
theory of pricing as well as innovation 
in dealing with information by com-
puters was part of the socio-technical 
context (Millo and Mackenzie, 2009), 
in which the use of derivatives started 
their expansion. 
The exponential growth of the use of 
derivatives (especially, options) must 
be traced back to application of options 
pricing model developed by Black, 
Scholes and Merton in the American 
Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(Millo and MacKenzie, 2009, p. 639). 
The so-called Black-Scholes-Merton 
model not only caused an increase of 
the attention to options market from 
financial economists (Turner, 2016 p. 
44) but also the spread of the idea that 
risk (ultimately, embodied in deriva-
tives) can be calculated based on math-
ematical (hence, objective) model. In 
this way, this model of pricing marked 
a new impulse in the will of handling 
risk through its rationalization and in-
strumentalization8.
Finance was a well-established part of 
the curriculum in the business schools 
of U.S. universities in the 1950s. How-
ever, as MacKenzie (2008) exposes, 
by the late 1960s, the descriptive and 
institutional study of finance had been 
eclipsed by the analytical and mathe-
matical approaches that came from eco-
nomics. This was not only a change of 
style, but also a way of impacting in the 
financial market. Particularly, during 
the 1960s, economics allowed a change 
of mood in relation to speculation (es-
pecially, with options). “Economists 
postulated that stock price movements 
could be modelled with reasonable ac-
curacy” (Millo and MacKenzie, 2003, 
p. 114), that is, through models, data, 
and computer power would be pos-
sible to overcome the idea of gambling 
attached to the trade of derivatives 
and to create a safe environment to do 
investments.
Economics was essential to legitimate 
the establishment of an option market. 
In this context emerged a number 
of theories that sought to explain 
 8 It is important to highlight that, as Millo and MacKenzie (2003) show, 
the use of derivatives after the crash of 1929 was considered suspicious 
of gambling and speculation. The market of futures was regulated by the 
Supreme Court in 1905, establishing the necessity of underlying physical 
assets if they pretend to be legal. They, instead, focused on options due 
to stock certificates already exist in a small non-certificate New York 
market. 

































and predict the functioning of option 
market9, however, it was only with 
Black-Scholes-Merton model that al-
lowed a real expansion of the use of 
derivatives. This text does not aim to 
explain this theory, nor to evaluate its 
accuracy. Rather, it aims to consider it 
as the breaking point that enabled the 
idea of calculating, then, managing 
risk, spread from the finances to other 
sectors of the economy and society. 
Beyond the accuracy of this model, it 
embodies the possibility of valuing risk 
through pricing derivatives, hence, from 
then on, risk is calculable, measurable, 
and ultimately, manageable. This same 
underlying idea appears in the practices 
of Enterprise Risk Management that, 
as Power (2007) points out, represents 
the change from risk analysis to risk 
management.
The use of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model fit the technical environment of 
the newly founded Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange (cboe) in 1973. This 
statistical model was useful for single 
traders handling small specialized 
portfolios interested in an accessible 
way of predicting options contract’s 
prices. Through using Black’s sheets 
(Millo and MacKenzie, 2009, p. 642), 
they could change positions to take ad-
vantage of a price discrepancy. With the 
increasing sophistication in trading, the 
spreading of this model, however, was 
not related to an own characteristic of it. 
As Millo and MacKenzie (2009, p. 644) 
notice, it was caused by a new practice: 
planning in advance the following day’s 
trading ‘game plan’. Those decisions 
were based on the model that allowed 
trading firms to express risk in acces-
sible terms as well as to construct a clear 
image of the potential situations of the 
markets. Therefore, the Black-Scholes-
Merton model not only facilitated the 
calculation of prices in first instance, 
but also became in a way of commu-
nication among different traders and 
trading firms. Planning and evaluation 
rested on this model; notwithstanding, 
its primarily use was to predict option 
prices of single contracts. 
As popularity of options arose, trading 
spread from cboe to other exchanges. 
The American Stock Exchange in 
New York (amex), the Pacific Stock 
Exchange in San Francisco (pse), the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (phlx) 
among others, emerge as new partici-
pants in this market. With an increasing 
number of actors and the entrance of 
large investment firms, trader’s new 
management practices were required. In 
order to face these challenges, trading 
firms use the Black-Scholes-Merton as 
a tool to calculate risk in hypothetical 
scenarios, “instead of calculating prices 
for each of the positions and then sum-
ming up these results, the new approach 
took a hypothetical result as its starting 
point” (Millo and MacKenzie, 2009, p. 
65) That is, running scenario-simulating 
traders evaluate the impact of a market 
movement from a portfolio’s position. 
Those scenarios stemmed from using 
Black-Scholes-Merton model so much 
as a price calculator as risk calculator. 
This general principle would be in the 
core of methodologies as Value-at-Risk 
(VaR), which, as Power shows is one of 
the key elements in order to understand 
 9 See Mackenzie (2008).

































the risk management as a common prac-
tice since the 1990s.
Undoubtedly, the spreading of the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model was a 
result of a specific socio-technical 
context determined by the use of 
mathematical approaches in finances 
framed in a broader establishment of 
neoclassical school10 as the dominant 
paradigm in economics as well as a con-
stantly technical innovation embodied 
in more powerful technology such as 
computers11. Nonetheless, the impor-
tance of this model rests on the “bi-
directionality” embedded in this model, 
“the fact that it offered two equivalent 
procedures through which quantitate 
estimates of risk and prices could be 
calculated” (Millo and MacKenzie, 
2009, p. 642). Indeed, as MacKenzie, 
(2003 p.856) exposes, since 1973, “a 
wide of situations involving uncertainty 
have been reconceptualized as implicit 
options,” which is, this model allowed 
a new idea of risk that could encompass 
from bonds, insurance contracts or a 
film sequel.
As aforementioned, derivates embody 
the way of calculating risk as well as a 
way of making it tradable. With the use 
the Black-Scholes-Merton model to cal-
culate the price of options, risk became 
a manageable thing (a commodity), “the 
fundamental theory of finance, in which 
returns on assets are always relative 
to risk, had made risk management a 
conceptually thinkable part of the cor-
porate value creation process since the 
1960s” (Power, 2007, p. 71). Moreover, 
as Millo and Mackenzie (2009) and 
Power (2007) shows in detail, value, 
price and risk calculation changed how 
risk was regarded in an organization, 
moving from just calculate risk to us-
ing it to manage an organization with a 
business-focused approach. Therefore, 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
emerges in the 1990s as the principal 
risk management technique that consid-
ers a “whole of enterprise” risk metric. 
At the same time, the idea of “Value-
at-Risk” (VaR), taken into account in 
the model-based practices in finances, 
appears as the way of dealing with risk 
from entrepreneurial perspective.
 10 It is important to recall that one of the main critiques to neoclassical 
rests on the illusion of handling the future ignoring the “radical indeter-
minacy” underlying in every social phenomenon including the economy. 
Hence, every attempt to model risk, future prices and future scenarios are 
inevitably incomplete. The error of starting from a predictive standpoint, 
is the “inherent error” that neoclassical school has its epistemological 
structure. However, as Varoufakis, Halevi and Theocarakis (2011, p. 
292) assert, “before tackling the real issues confronting the real world, 
we must see each and every one of these models as indispensable but 
incomplete mental exercises; as necessary errors on the road to the pos-
sibility of enlightenment. In short, economics’ Inherent Error cannot be 
defeated by the power of our reason. Reason can only overcome it by 
reaching out to, and engaging with, History”. 
 11 As Panitch and Gindin (2012) notice, the concentration in the 
uses of new financial instruments rested on the possibility of develop-
ment sophisticated computers developed by “the quants”, economists, 
mathematicians and engineers hired by large investment banks such as 
Goldman Sachs in the 1960s and 1970s (Panitch and Gindin, 2012, p. 
175). In the same vein, Lapavitsas and Dos Santos (2008) asserts that 
the Black-Scholes-Merton model rely absolutely on computing power. 

































As Power (2007, p.71) points out, with 
the publication, in 1993, of the RiskMet-
rics technology for calculating capital 
at risk by J.P. Morgan, it is possible to 
trace the first attempt to standardization 
of VaR. An entrepreneurial perspective 
of risk implies the possibility of manag-
ing it. VaR represents four changes in 
organizational culture (Power, 2007, 
p.75). First, a rational response to 
volatility in financial markets and the 
need to manage assets growth; second, 
a unifying approach regarding organiza-
tion as a whole entity; third, a respond 
to the regulatory capital requirement; 
and fourth, it allows and expansionary 
potential for abstract risk-metrics in 
new domains, extending the boundar-
ies of risk transfer to other assets. In 
short, “VaR is more than a technique, it 
represents the financialization of gover-
nance” (Power, 2007, p. 75), that is, the 
application of the logic and language of 
risk-return.
CONClusION
Nowadays, risk is a key aspect of soci-
ety in general. However, as it has been 
argued, it is more fruitful to ask how and 
why risk has become a powerful concept 
than trying to find a single definition of 
risk. Following Power’s analysis, we 
can see how in the mid-1990s the emer-
gence of risk management as a popular 
practice among organizations depicted 
an important change in how society con-
ceived risk. The convergence between 
risk calculation and risk management 
regarding risk as a manageable factor 
than merely a measurable and calculable 
entity shows how organizations started 
changing their governance. However, 
the aim of this text was to go further, 
demonstrating that this idea of calcula-
tion and measurement that allows to 
consider risk a manageable entity can be 
traced back to the way of dealing with 
risk in the finances with the use of de-
rivatives in the early 1970s. The use and 
spreading of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model in the option market since 1973 
is considered here as a breaking point 
that established a way of calculating 
through prices. 
It was a complex process that encom-
passes new approaches in finances, new 
theories, markets where to apply these, 
and constant technological innovations 
that allowed to handle monumental 
quantities of information. This socio-
technical context depicts the way by 
which economic actors tried to deal 
with risk. However, the spreading of 
those techniques was possible due to 
a broader context that can be called 
‘financialization’. Innovations that al-
lowed unthinkable profits, on one hand, 
and a legitimization of the speculative 
practice as normal economic process 
like producing shoes, on the other, en-
abled a tremendous change in the role of 
finances in relation to the real economy. 
Today, we are struggling to understand 
its consequences not only to economy, 
but also to everyday life.
One idea can change the way of deal-
ing with something, even more, from 
a poststructuralist perspective, one 
idea can create that thing. Therefore, 
it is important to attempt to understand 
how that ideas are materialized in the 
world by practices. Risk management 
is a practice that rests on the possibility 

































of calculating, hence, managing risk. 
However, it is also crucial to deepen in 
this practices within the organizations. 
The way of organizing uncertainty 
nowadays brings to the fore the problem 
of managerialism in the financialized 
world (Knafo and Dutta, 2016).
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